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INDUSTRY WATCH
7KH7UDQV3DFLÀF
Partnership and Vietnam
Opening up a bold new world for 
Vietnam’s trade and industry may  
not be so easy.
V ietnam began its journey towards 
economic reform in 1986 when the 
government initiated the Doi Moi policy 
with the intent of establishing a socialist-
market oriented economy. Since then, 
the country has engaged in 15 free trade 
agreements (most of them bilateral) 
along with numerous policy changes that 
have led to the gradual opening up of 
the economy. The results are evident: 
Vietnam’s trade increased ten-fold from 
US$30 billion in 2000 to a lmost 
US$300 billion in 2014. The fact that 
Vietnam moved up from a ranking of 
148 to 131 on the Index of Economic 
Freedom1 in just one year (between 2015 
and 2016) illustrates that the nation is 
poised to push further up the economic 
liberalisation ladder. Yet, the climb will 
not be easy.
7KH7UDQV3DFLÀF3DUWQHUVKLS733
D WUDGHDJUHHPHQWDPRQJ3DFLÀF5LP
countries—Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the 
U.S. and Vietnam—is Vietnam’s most 
ambitious free trade deal to date. 
Collectively, TPP member countries 
represent 40 percent of global GDP 
and one-third of global trade; and their 
combined population of 800 million 
makes the TPP the largest regional trade 
agreement to date.2 
Should it come into effect, the TPP 
will offer a huge opportunity for Vietnam 
By Duong Nhu Hung and Tran Quang Dang
to increase its access to these markets 
DVZHOO DVEHQHÀW IURP WKHVHDPOHVVÁRZ
of trade and investments across the 
12 nation states. On the f lip side, 
Vietnam will be subject to extraordinary 
competitive pressures and policy reform 
measures—even more so than when 
it joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2007, or in its preparations 
for 2018 when the A SE A N Free 
Trade A g reement is scheduled to 
remove all import duties for the ten 
members in the Southeast Asian bloc. 
Compliance with WTO membership is 
more achievable than meeting the 
obligations set by either the ASEAN 
agreement or the TPP, despite the 
WTO being a much larger, complex 
group of countries. 
In this article, we discuss the 
potential opportunities and challenges 
posed by the TPP for Vietnamese industry 
and business. 
Free trade: Does everyone 
benefit?
,Q'DYLG5LFDUGRÀUVWSURSRXQGHG
the Theory of Comparative Advantage 
and explained why a country can 
benefit from trade even when its 
labour productivity is higher for all 
goods produced (that is, it has a higher 
absolute advantage) than that of other 
countries. Admittedly, we don’t operate in 
perfect markets that offer perfect solutions 
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IURPHFRQRPLF WKHRU\+RZHYHU WKHEHQHÀWVRI IUHH WUDGHKDYHEHHQ LOOXVWUDWHG WLPH 
and again, by researchers, policy makers, and multilateral aid organisations. For 
instance, according to one study by the International Monetary Fund, a one percent increase 
in a country’s trade openness (measured as merchandise trade as a share of GDP) can 
result in an increase in GDP per capita in the range of 0.7 to 1.2 percent.3 
With a ratio of trade to GDP of 161 percent, the fifth highest in the world in 
2014,49LHWQDP·VHFRQRP\KDVDOUHDG\UHDSHGD ORWRIEHQHÀW IURPWUDGH OLEHUDOLVDWLRQ 
(refer to Figure 1). The country’s per capita GDP has increased from US$239.4 in 1985 
(pre-Doi Moi) to US$2,052.3 in 2014.5 For the past 15 years, its annual GDP growth 
has hovered between 5.5 and 7.5 percent.6 Taking into account purchasing power 
parity, Vietnam’s GNI per capita has more than doubled between 2001 and 2014, from 
US$2,220 to US$5,350.7
,W LV KRSHG WKDW9LHWQDPZLOO JHW HYHQPRUHEHQHÀWV LI WKH733 DJUHHPHQW FRPHV 
into effect. Overall, improved trade and investment will result in higher economic 
growth. As the member with the lowest labour cost among TPP countries, Vietnam can 
potentially attract a lot of foreign investment. With MNCs setting up manufacturing 
operations in Vietnam, consumers will also have better access to cheaper high-quality 
branded products. 
Nonetheless, there are several factors that make the TPP particularly challenging 
IRU 9LHWQDP 7KH ÀUVW RI FRXUVH LV WKDW WKH DJUHHPHQW LV DPRQJ  FRXQWULHV ZLWK 
As the member with the lowest labour cost among 
TPP countries, Vietnam can potentially attract a lot 
of foreign investment.
vastly different levels of development 
and types of government. The contrast 
between the U.S., Japan and Australia 
on the one side, and Brunei, Peru, 
Malaysia or Vietnam on the other, is a 
case in point.
COMPETITION
Under the TPP, tariffs on most goods 
and services will be reduced (in the case 
of Singapore, tariffs on goods will be 
completely removed), and Vietnam’s 
market will be gradually opened to 
foreign competition. Since the TPP 
contains member countries that are 
home to powerful MNCs, Vietnamese 
firms will find themselves exposed to 
competition they had never encountered 
EHIRUH$6($1EDVHGÀUPVZLWKSHUKDSV
the exception of a few Singaporean 
companies, do not have the same level 
of global competency as large American 
DQG -DSDQHVHÀUPV7KLV LV D IULJKWHQLQJ
SURVSHFW IRUPDQ\9LHWQDPHVHÀUPV DQG 
small business owners, particularly in 
the animal husbandry and agricultural 
sectors, whose scales of operation and 
automation levels are much lower than 
those of their peers in North America, 
Australia and New Zealand. And 
competition will only grow as more 
countries join the TPP. For example, 
Thailand and South Korea have already 
signalled their intent and interest to apply 
for TPP membership in the near future.
5HJDUGOHVV WKH 733 RIIHUV JUHDW
opportunity for Vietnamese companies. 
It will provide access to lucrative foreign 
markets, even though entering these 
markets will require greater managerial 
skills and investments in human capital 
and technology to make higher quality 
low-cost products.
CAPITAL FLOWS
Foreign investment will also flow 
unhindered under the TPP. This is 
TRADE OPENNESS (MERCHANDISE TRADE AS  
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Once the TPP goes into 
effect, Vietnam must 
openly disclose policy 
information to investors. 
This will be a significant 
culture change for 
policy makers.
another key aspect where the TPP differs 
from the WTO and ASEAN structures. 
When the TPP goes into effect, Vietnamese 
firms will gain access to credit from 
IRUHLJQ EDQNV DQG ÀQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV
+RZHYHU IRUHLJQÀUPVZLOO DOVRKDYH WKH
opportunity to invest in local companies, 
including banks. Thus, although there 
will be enormous financial benefit for 
Vietnam, it will however expose the 
country to the global financial system, 
and increase its vulnerability to higher 
risk of capital flight in the event of an 
economic downturn.
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
Vietnamese firms must comply with a 
number of international trade norms 
and standards relating to intellectual 
property, labour and the environment 
in order to participate in the reduced 
tariff schedule of the TPP. This includes 
compliance with criteria set by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization 
and adherence to child labour and 
workers’ rights laws, as well as certain 
guidelines on environmental pollution. 
There are two key challenges here. 
The first is regulatory reform at the 
government level, which requires political 
resolve and will be a major force for 
pushing economic reform. Currently, 
Vietnam maintains strict laws on 
information disclosure in the name of 
national security, meaning that the 
government’s policies are still quite 
opaque. Once the TPP goes into effect, 
Vietnam must openly disclose policy 
information to investors. This will 
be a significant culture change for 
policymakers.
The second is industry compliance— 
which is the more difficult challenge— 
as it will require educating the businesses 
and bringing about cultura l and 
organisational change across a large 
number of players that are accustomed 
to ‘business as usual’. This will be a 
VLJQLÀFDQWWUDQVIRUPDWLRQIRU9LHWQDPHVH
companies, and will materially add to 
the complexity of business operations, 
especially with regard to cross-border 
input protocols involved in entrepôt 
trade. 
For example, if a Vietnamese 
company imports a production input 
from a company in ASEAN that is not 
a member of the TPP, say yarn from 
Indonesia, and then uses that yarn to 
produce T-shirts that are sold in Canada, 
then those T-shirts would not qualify 
for the TPP tariff schedule. To be 
included in the tariff schedule, a product 
must be completely sourced from, and 
manufactured in, TPP member countries. 
This is, in part, beneficial for Vietnam 
because it can better compete on price 
against other low-cost manufacturing 
countries like China (which has not 
signalled its intention to join the TPP 
so far). 
But there are downsides to the 
input protocols too. Take the example of 
pharmaceuticals. Presently, Vietnam is 
able to supply cheap drugs by 
manufacturing generics or importing 
such drugs from India. However, if 
these drugs are in violation of the 
intellectual property (IP) rights of TPP 
member countries, then Vietnam will 
no longer be allowed to sell generics, 
thereby substantially increasing the 
cost of pharmaceuticals. This is a big 
issue since many generic drugs from 
both India and Vietnam are currently 
reverse engineered, which is in violation 
of the TPP IP regime. If Vietnam is 
found to be peddling these drugs, the 
country could face punitive action, such 
as fines and trade sanctions, from TPP 
member countries.
IP infringement has been a problem 
for Vietnam in the past, especially in 
terms of counterfeit trafficking with 
China. However, the government has 
begun cracking down on IP violations 
and enforcing penalties. This can include 
up to ten years in prison for severe 
infractions, such as traff icking, but 
can also include more minor forms of 
FULPLQDOSURVHFXWLRQDQGÀQHV
BUDGETARY IMPACT
Once businesses are compliant with 
the TPP regime, they will be able to take 
part in the new tariff structure. While this 
applies to both importers and exporters, 
Vietnam exporters will gain more than 
the importers. For instance, in 2014, 
Vietnamese exports were subject to 
US$2.6 billion in tariffs compared to 
only US$892 million levied on the 
country’s imports. At zero tariffs, this 
amounts to an immediate US$1.7 billion 
in tax savings, which is equivalent to 
0.91 percent of Vietnam’s GDP. If the 
tariff rate is gradually reduced, the 
country can expect to see a net total tax 
savings of 4.5 percent of GDP over the 
next 10 years.8
Of course, this also means that 
the Vietnamese government will be 
collecting less in tariffs. Currently, the 
government earns 9.4 percent of its 
revenue from tariffs. However, imports 
from TPP member countries only 
constitute 2.7 percent of total revenue, 
which the government will likely offset 
with increased consumption ta x on 
products like tobacco, alcohol, gasoline 
and automobiles.
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Rebalancing trade partners
The trade weight of Vietnam’s trading partners will also be 
impacted by the TPP. Today, China is Vietnam’s largest trading 
partner, accounting for 30 percent of total imports into Vietnam 
and 10 percent of Vietnamese exports. While trade between 
Vietnam and China accounts for 20 percent of Vietnam’s total 
trade, it adds up to a mere two percent of China’s total trade. This 
creates an issue of economic security for Vietnam—if there are 
any disruptions to trade due to the territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea, for example, Vietnam’s economy will suffer 
disproportionately more from the setback.
In addition to an unfavourable trade balance, the trade 
structure also puts Vietnam at a disadvantage. Most of 
Vietnam’s exports to China are low value-added products 
(raw materials like crude oil, rice, shrimp, and cashew) while its 
imports from China consist of higher value-added products such 
as intermediate and capital goods. In 2014, Vietnam was a net 
exporter of US$4 billion in raw materials to China, but a net 
importer of US$16.4 billion in capital goods, US$13.6 billion in 
intermediate goods, and US$2.5 billion in consumer goods (refer 
to Figure 2). For example, Vietnam exporters use intermediate 
goods like fabrics from China as an input for the local textile 
industry, and export ready-made garments to other countries.
Our further investigation reveals that while Chinese imports 
are able to easily penetrate the Vietnamese market, Vietnamese 
exports struggle to establish a footprint in China, despite lower 
tariffs. In 2014, Vietnam exported only US$3.3 billion of 
consumer goods to China compared to US$32 billion to the 
TPP countries, even though the average tax rate is 5.71 percent 
in China compared to 7.36 percent in the TPP countries. China 
enjoys favourable access to the ASEAN markets in general and 
Vietnam, in particular, because of the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area agreement, which is one of the main reasons for Vietnam’s 
high trade deficit of US$28.4 billion (in 2014) with China. 
Vietnamese exports to China face direct competition with 
comparable products produced in China itself, which have the 
Partner
Trade
Flow
Raw
Materials 
Intermediate
Goods 
Consumer
Goods 
Capital
Goods Total 
% Total Exports
(Imports) 
WORLD Export 23.74 19.72 60.81 44.52 148.80 100%
Import 11.85 54.38 25.86 53.77 145.86 100%
  Net Export 11.88 (34.66) 34.96 (9.25) 2.93  
ASEAN Export 3.18 5.04 5.14 5.61 18.98 13%
Import 1.68 6.91 7.24 6.70 22.54 15%
  Net Export 1.50 (1.87) (2.10) (1.09) (3.56)  
CHINA Export 4.59 3.25 3.28 3.74 14.87 10%
Import 0.55 16.82 5.80 20.13 43.30 30%
  Net Export 4.04 (13.57) (2.52) (16.38) (28.43)  
EU27 Export 3.17 1.10 11.78 11.80 27.85 19%
Import 0.48 2.50 2.40 3.39 8.76 6%
  Net Export  2.69 (1.40) 9.39 8.41 19.09  
TPP Export 10.24 4.79 32.09 11.09 58.21 39%
Import 4.03 9.85 7.31 12.23 33.43 23%
  Net Export 6.21 (5.06) 24.78 (1.15) 24.78  
OTHERS Export 4.57 6.50 10.20 14.48 35.75 24%
Import 5.37 20.69 7.40 15.22 48.69 33%
  Net Export (0.80) (14.19) 2.80 (0.75) (12.94)
VIETNAM’S TRADE PARTNERS IN 2014 (US$ BILLION)
FIGURE 2 Source: UN Comtrade, International Trade Statistics Database
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out of Vietnam’s top 20 export products 
could penetrate the Chinese market 
compared to 14 that could penetrate well 
into the TPP markets. 
If the TPP comes into effect, imports 
from China will be impacted on two 
OHYHOVÀUVWWKHJRRGVLPSRUWHGIURP733
countries will become more affordable 
for Vietnamese consumers; and second, 
Vietnam producers are more likely to 
replace intermediate goods from China 
with those from TPP markets. 
The TPP also gives Vietnam the 
opportunity to diversify its portfolio of 
trading partners and enter into potentially 
PRUH OXFUDWLYHPDUNHWV 7KH WUDGH ÁRZV 
are more advantageous with exports from 
Vietnam to TPP countries accounting 
for 39 percent of Vietnamese exports, 
while imports from TPP countries to 
Vietnam formed only 23 percent of 
Vietnam’s total imports. In addition, 
Vietnam maintains a net export position 
with the TPP in both consumer and 
capital goods, industries that are large 
employers in Vietnam. This rebalancing 
is supported by Vietnam’s comparative 
advantage in the production of textiles, 
shoes, suitcases, and seafood–all of 
which have high penetration into TPP 
member countries but do not do well 
in China and most ASEAN countries. 
Vietnamese exporters of these products 
will gain the most by selling to the 
U.S., Malaysia and Canada.
So, who will benefit?
Producers of consumer and capital goods, 
particularly from Singapore, Japan and the 
U.S., will certainly receive more orders 
IURP9LHWQDPZKHQWDULIIVDUHVLJQLÀFDQWO\
reduced on gasoline, machine and 
equipment, cars, poultry, milk, wine and 
tobacco. Similarly, Vietnamese producers 
of textiles, shoes, suitcases, rice, seafood, 
rubbers, etc. will witness a jump in 
sales to the American, Malaysian, and 
Canadian markets. 
Some local industries will a lso 
have the opportunity to turn around 
their competitive positions if they can 
leverage Vietnam’s low labour costs. 
For instance, the car manufacturing 
industry in Vietnam had traditionally 
found it diff icult to attract foreign 
investments, and is deemed to be in a 
disadvantageous position when Vietnam 
eliminates automobile tariffs for the 
A SE A N countries starting 2018. 
However, if car manufacturers in 
Vietnam successfully take advantage of 
having the lowest labour costs among 
the TPP countries, they will be able to 
at t ract foreig n invest ments a nd 
become production bases to export to 
other countries in Asia, or even other 
TPP countries.
MNCs will be the biggest winners 
because they will benefit from ta x 
savings on the sides of both imports 
and exports. It is obvious that the 
TPP agreement will help these global 
distributors save tax and increase sales 
and profits on the products imported 
from the TPP countries to Vietnam. 
However, they will also capture most of 
the ta x savings from the products 
exported from Vietnam to the other 
TPP countries.
Vietna mese manufacturers w il l 
FHUWDLQO\EHQHÀW LQ WHUPVRI H[SDQGLQJ
sales volumes; however, whether the 
MNCs will pass on the tax savings to 
Vietnamese manufacturers depends on 
the negotiation between the two parties. 
It is highly unlikely that Vietnamese 
manufacturers will be able to negotiate 
D VLJQLÀFDQWO\ IDYRXUDEOH SULFHPDLQO\
because of f ierce competition among 
Vietnamese f irms. Some Vietnamese 
businesses will receive a windfall of 
orders, but order prices are unlikely to 
increase significantly and workers will 
Vol.3/Asian Management Insights
likely not experience much, if any, change in their standard of living. Vietnam needs 
to avoid the trap of being seen only as a labour-abundant country that produces low- 
quality, cheap products. It must use its preferential relations with TPP countries as 
a means of climbing up the value chain.   
No gain without pain
Of the 12 countries signing the TPP, Vietnam is perhaps the most profoundly 
impacted. There are both positive and negative aspects to any free trade deal, with 
some winners and some losers, but what matters most is the net effect on the welfare of 
society as a whole, and that of the average Vietnamese. 
If Vietnam is to become more internationally competitive and enjoy a higher 
standard of living, like Japan or South Korea, then the country must commit to 
substantial change at both the government and business levels in order to adapt to the 
new environment. The rewards are high and there is a strong willingness among the 
people of Vietnam to step up to these challenges. 
7KHFRXQWU\KDVFHUWDLQO\DOUHDG\RYHUFRPHPXFKJUDYHUDQGPRUHGLIÀFXOWFKDOOHQJHV 
in the last 40 years. Yet there is still scope for Vietnam to improve its governance 
and economy, and in that respect, the TPP should be examined in the context of 
Vietnam’s history of reform. This will no doubt be a rocky transition. 
But consider the alternative of not joining, which is also a risk; the risk of 
maintaining the status quo. The TPP represents an opportunity to drive Vietnam 
forward and position itself for longer-term growth. By entering the TPP, Vietnam 
will be forced to become more competitive, which in turn (hopefully) will lead to 
greater economic, social and regulatory reform. It will have to be a delicately 
balanced transition, and smart investments will be needed to guide the country 
towards greater prosperity. Cautious optimism is needed.
Duong Nhu Hung
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